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Abstract: This essay aims at analyzing the main 
aspects related to a prison system’s lawsuit judged 
by the Brazilian Supreme Court in which the “Un-
constitutional State of Affairs” adjudication tech-
nique was firstly examined. Challenging the base 
arguments that were presented in the ADPF 347, 
Justice Rapporteur Marco Aurélio, the article’s 
purpose is points out that there was not an insti-
tutional failure of both Legislative and Executive 
branches of government in order to justify a struc-
tural intervention for overcoming alleged barriers. 
A parallel with Colombian Supreme Court adjudi-
cation practices will be drawn in accordance with 
the legal transplants theory to understand how 
Brazil would achieve its reach just importing a 
structural injunction model that even in Colombia 
did not work in prisons.
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Resumo: Este ensaio tem como objetivo analisar os 
principais aspectos relacionados ao julgamento pelo 
Supremo Tribunal Federal da ADPF 347, relator Mi-
nistro Maurco Aurélio, acerca do sistema prisional 
brasileiro. Neste caso, o Supremo Tribunal Federal, 
pela primeira vez, se pronunciou formalmente a 
respeito do “estado de coisas inconstitucional”, uma 
técnica de julgamento utilizada pela Corte Consti-
tucional da Colômbia. Ao longo da análise, tentar-
-se-á demonstrar que não eram exclusivamente os 
apontados bloqueios institucionais dos Poderes Exe-
cutivo e Legislativo que justificavam uma interven-
ção estrutural da Corte. As reiteradas práticas judi-
ciais de encarceramento em massa, em detrimento 
da aplicação de outras medidas cautelares, também 
eram responsáveis pela retroalimentação de viola-
ções a direitos fundamentais dos presos. Por fim, 
será traçado um paralelo com o modelo de jurisdição 
constitucional colombiano com o escopo de identifi-
car se a importação da ténica de jurisdição consubs-
tanciou um mero transplante legal que, mesmo na 
Colômbia, não apresentou resultados positivo no 
sistema prisional.
Palavras-chave: Estado de coisas inconstitucio-
nal. Injunção estrutural. ADPF 347. Suprema Cor-
te brasileira. Suprema Corte colombiana. Trans-
plantes legais.
Thiago Luís Santos Sombra*
ADPF 347 AND THE “UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATE OF AFFAIRS” OF BRAZIL’S PRISON 
SYSTEM
ADPF 347 E O “ESTADO DE COISAS INCONSTITUCIONAL” DO SISTEMA PRISIONAL BRASILEIRO
* Law Ph.D student in Universidade de Brasília, DF; Master in Law from Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo; Assis-




Thiago Luís Santos Sombra
Joaçaba, v. 17, n. 2, p. 649-656, maio/ago. 2016 EJJL
The Brazilian Supreme Court has recently judged a lawsuit regarding the allegedly inhu-
mane conditions of the country’s penitentiary system (Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito 
Fundamental n. 347, 2015). The claim was filed by the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) (Recon-
do, 2015), alongside the Human Rights Clinic of the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ) (Clínica 
de Direitos Fundamentais da Faculdade de Direito da UERJ, 2015). All 26 States, the Federal District 
and the Union acted as defendants of the mandatory requirements. What was so important in this 
case that brought it to newspaper headlines was that, for the first time in Brazilian history, the 
Supreme Court adopted a constitutional adjudication technique called The Unconstitutional State of 
Affairs (De Giorgi, Campilongo, & Faria, 2015), originally upheld by the Colombia Constitutional 
Court in a case related to cruel conditions in that country’s prisons (Sentencia n. T-153/98, 1998). 
The Unconstitutional State of Affairs is a legal ruling that allows the Constitutional Court 
to acknowledge the failure of both the Legislative and Executive branches of government to enforce 
public policies against widespread and systemic violation of fundamental rights (Urueña, 2012, p. 
260-261), thus determining a judicial intervention in order to combat the structural causes of the 
violations and to put everything back in order with the Constitution. It is similar to the structural 
injunction in US (Fiss, 1992, p. 968) and South Africa (Hirsch, 2007, p. 15). 
When it takes place, the Court acts as an institutional coordinator, helping state organs 
overcome political and structural barriers and increase dialogue with civil society (Wilson, 2009). In 
other words, “[…] the Court issues orders for remedying the budgetary and administrative capacity 
shortfalls and establishes minimum mandatory levels of protection of human rights” (Cepededa-
-Espinosa, 2006). It must then abandon its counter-majoritarian position and become an activist 
stakeholder (Rodriguez-Garavito, 2010, 2014; Rodriguez-Garavito & Rodríguez Franco, 2010). Ins-
tead of a passive player and even a conventional judicial activist, the Constitutional Court becomes 
a political coordinator (Sepúlveda, 2008, p. 148). According to this judicial review model, the struc-
tural remedies implemented by Constitutional Courts are apparently the only way for stopping 
fundamental rights violations (Striffolino, 2010b). 
Despite having later developed into a consistent notion in Colombia (Rodriguez-Garavito, 
2014, pp. 113-117), the Brazilian Supreme Court had never employed such model, and that is what 
raises these fundamental questions: is it really necessary for the Brazilian Supreme Court to imple-
ment an adjudication practice that is strange to our cultural model based in a legal transplant? (Bo-
nilla Maldonado, 2007; López Medina, 2004; Mattei, 1994, 2006). What guarantees are there that 
Brazil will overcome inhuman conditions of prisons by adopting the Colombian model? Indeed, it 
seems that some particular judicial practices like imprison by every single crime instead of applying 
other restrictive penal measures are the main reason of the prison’s overcrowding. Definitely, this is 
not a matter that the Unconstitutional State of Affairs can resolve.
Beyond the scope of debating the degrading conditions of national penitentiary system, 
the case aforementioned deals primarily with the judicial review model practiced by the Brazilian 
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Supreme Court and its temptation to introduce blurred legal transplants.1 Unfortunately, that was 
the main intention of the plaintiff. In real, we are not focused on questioning the successful ex-
perience of Colombia. In Brazilian case, the problem relies much more in the effectiveness of the 
implementing process and in the bunch of monitoring institutions.2
In hearing sessions, the Attorney General (Bruno, 2015) attempted to strike down the ac-
tion by arguing that no State of Unconstitutional Affairs can be drawn, above all because the Executive 
Branch has been accomplishing efforts to solve the problems of penitentiary system. 
The judgment session has just finished and the Supreme Court ruled that some of the 
measures requested was already been adopted by judges.3 In other words, it means that the pronun-
ciation of The Unconstitutional State of Affairs was partially unsuitable for the Court. The action filed 
by PSOL had claimed eight immediate requests.4 Curiously, only one out of eight was presented 
against the Executive Branch. The other seven were related to flaws of the Judiciary Power itself. 
In the end, just two out of eight were upheld by the Court. The other six were refused because 
they were not so urgent, in accordance with Justice Rapporteur Marco Aurélio. As so, the Court 
(Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental n. 347, 2015) firstly determined the release 
of Penitentiary Fund by the Executive Branch to restore or to rebuild prisons and, secondly, imposed 
that judges should do the preliminary custody audience before imprisonment, which was already 
stated at the American Convention of Human Rights (articles 7.5 and 9.3).
Seemingly, a contradiction can be found in Court’s opinion. If only one upheld request was 
filed against Executive Branch and the other seven were against the Judiciary Power flaws, why should 
we believe that the pronunciation of The Unconstitutional State of Affairs would be the best way to im-
prove prisoners’ fundamental rights? Another interesting contradiction can be explained. Nevertheless 
one week before of this session the Supreme Court had upheld a case related to the custody audience 
(Supremo Tribunal Federal, 2015), the Justices ruled again the same subject! Twice less than two weeks!
Considering the previous aspects, it is feasible to conclude that this Colombian model of 
judicial review might be able to engender a crisis of democratic legitimacy to the Brazilian Supreme 
Court. And the main reason for this criticism concerns with both representation and deliberation 
values, as two important pillars of the political democratic theory (Avritzer, 2007; Rosanvallon, 2011; 
Urbinati, 2008). In young democracies like Brazil, judicial review should foster a sharing responsibility 
model compatible with the cultural values and the stage of institutional maturity. It proofs that the 
mere declaration of Unconstitutional State of Affairs would just sound as rhetorical decision.
1  As what happened in Brazil, the attempting to introduce legal transplants in Italy in order to reform criminal system was 
criticized by Grande (2000, p. 235).
2  Costa (2013, p. 25) has lately been underlining that the Supreme Court suffers from a rhetorical disease that is originated 
by its straight standpoint related to a miscomprehension of counter majoritarian practices. 
3  See Recurso Extraordinário n. 592.581 (emergency prisons’ repairs), Recurso Extraordinário n. 580252 (punitive damages 
for inhuman prisons’ conditions), and Recurso Extraordinário n. 641320.
4  The requests of the action were: the (i) exposition of legal basis on judicial sentences when enforcing prison despite the 
restriction measures of other rights, (ii) the custody audience which was already stated at the American Convention of 
Human Rights, articles 7.5 and 9.3, (iii) the creation of task-forces for reviewing prisoner’s penalties, (iv) the release of the 
Federal Penitentiary Fund and, as explained before, (v) the pronounce of “The Unconstitutional State of Affairs.”
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In addition, just to underline that the single transposition of The Unconstitutional State 
of Affairs would sound a piece of rhetorical argument in Brazilian case, the other State Attorney 
explained some figures of Colombian Penitentiary conditions, after their first sentence, T-153/98 
(Sentencia n. T-153/98, 1998). In 2001, a humanitarian mission of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Marcos Martínez, Tidball-Binz, & Yrigoyen Fajardo, 2001)5 was 
in Colombia and reported that the prisoners’ situation was worse than before the first declaration 
of The Unconstitutional State of Affairs in 1998 (Striffolino, 2010a). The UNHCR recognized that the 
Colombian Constitutional Court sentence was not enforceable in the end, claiming thereby the Co-
lombian Government to take the lead (Marcos Martínez, Tidball-Binz, & Yrigoyen Fajardo, 2001). 
After that, judging the sentence T-025, it seems that Constitutional Court improved its monitoring 
methods of enforcement (Rodriguez-Garavito, 2010).
However, recently (27 July 2015), the newspaper The Bogotá Post (Broderick, 2015) revea-
led that since Colombian Constitutional Court declared the Unconstitutional State of Affairs, “[…] 
little has been done to find real solutions, apart from building 11 new prisons, which is at best ina-
dequate in terms of improving conditions.” Therefore, “[…] it is possible to see a deep contradiction 
in Colombian reality. While the country’s Constitution advocates the protection of human rights, 
its justice system seems unable to stop infringing on them.”
Strictly speaking, the Brazilian case shows a pattern of constitutional adjudication prac-
tices which hides away some clear rules of the deliberation process (Rodriguez, 2013, p. 34; Silva, 
2013, p. 560). The efforts to make the Supreme Court the key player of such public policies without 
changing the governance system might create a huge tension between the Executive, the Congress 
and the Judiciary instead of promoting an institutional development. Furthermore, as Professor 
Mark Tushnet has insightfully contended in a debate with the Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Luís 
Roberto Barroso at Harvard Law School,6 “[…] as a democracy ages this tension might not be some-
thing positive.” A Court’s opinion which merely pronounces the Unconstitutional State of Chaos does 
not contribute to the democratic values of a republican regime.7 In this case, it is clear that Brazilian 
Supreme Court is more focused not on clarifying rhetorical procedures or working for the legitimacy 
of its judicial activism.8 Brazilian Supreme Court, in these circumstances, seems to be just seduced 
to show even more power (Vieira, 2008, p. 445). 
5  For the ACNUR’s report, see Naciones Unidas (2001).
6  See Política e Judiciário (2011) at min. 37, when prof. Tushnet claims that judicial activism in Brazil, as a young democracy 
would be positive, however as the democracy ages...
7  Urbinati (2008) claims that “Constitutional Courts seek to empower themselves most of all to improve its democractic 
representation” (p. 45).
8  Gargarella (2005, p. 22) points out that one important feature of the liberal constitutional model is related to the hyper-
trophy of contra majoritarian practices and arrangements by Constitutional Courts, in order to select the most relevant 
questions of democratic politics.
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